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We had a dialogue with another analyst on the platform regarding Thunderbird Entertainment (TBRD). To read our coverage report on Thunderbird, click here.
We hope you enjoy this discussion!
Sophon Capital: Thunderbird is a TV and film production studio based in Vancouver, Canada. They have two lines of business. One is doing production service work for clients that mainly are TV networks and the streaming platforms. The other is doing owned IP development, which is developing their own content.
With Thunderbird today, I believe you are getting a wonderful business trading at a wonderful price. It’s compelling bottom’s up. We think top down, there are structural tailwinds in content production. We think there is going to be a re-acceleration of spend among the streaming platforms, and Thunderbird represents a pick and shovel way to play that theme without making a bet on a specific streamer.
When I talk about it being a wonderful business, what makes a business great? You typically say a great business is one with sizable moats, durable competitive advantages. Thunderbird 100% fits the bill on various fronts. I lived in Los Angeles for a little over a year and have a pretty good base of contacts in the entertainment industry who were able to point me to second order connections that could speak knowledgeably about Thunderbird. I talked to over 20 people when I was doing channel checks, everything from people at the talent agencies to people working at the streaming platforms to actual creators, producers, writers, and animators. The feedback was resounding and clear that Thunderbird is a very trusted and reliable partner with a rock solid reputation in the industry and has a set of capabilities that allow it to work with the most demanding clients.
Thunderbird is a vertically integrated studio. They produce three types of content: animated content, almost entirely children's productions, but they did some work on Rick and Morty. They also own the rights to Super Team Canada, which is an adult animated series co-produced with Will Arnett of SNL. They also make scripted content opportunistically, comedies and dramas, shows like Kim's Convenience, which is now in its sixth season of production, and unscripted content. That’s mainly documentaries and reality TV.
They were founded in 2003. They have evolved. When they were founded, they were founded by the former president and CEO Tim Gamble, and they initially were a quasi venture capital fund to invest in IP and have had the goal of building global major brands. A pivotal moment came in 2011 when Frank Giustra, who is the founder of Lionsgate Studios, invested in the company, and they used the proceeds of that to acquire the IP for the Blade Runner franchise. The business really transformed itself over the next few years through two major acquisitions. One was Great Pacific Media in 2014, which is the division of Thunderbird that does their live action content. In 2016, they acquired Atomic Cartoons, which is their animation studio and was really the crown jewel flagship piece of the business.
Thunderbird, when I say it is cheap, it’s extraordinarily cheap. You can buy today at 1.6 times trailing twelve month EBITDA. To contextualize how mispriced that is, it has a five year revenue CAGR north of 20%. Last year's revenue growth was 25%. It has EBITDA margins anywhere between 15% and 30%. So you’re paying less than two times EBITDA for a business growing top line 20% plus, with 30% normalized EBITDA margins, that are near recurring in nature.
Going deeper into the business, currently 90% in the trailing twelve months is production service work. As I mentioned, that is a low risk fee for service work, and Thunderbird gets hired to produce a show with costs fully covered by the client plus a margin on top of that. That is mainly sourced from the animation division. It is accounted for in IFRS on a percentage of completion basis. So the revenues are accrued and the costs are incurred as the work is done. That provides steady, very predictable cash flow and visibility for the company. It strategically functions as a lead generation funnel for IP development. They are able to deliver high quality work under service work, which they work with marquee clients like Disney, Netflix, and Apple, and that allows them to build credibility and trust, which they then use to pitch and monetize their own IP.
The next economical model they work under is owned IP development, which in the last twelve months accounted for 10% of their revenue. Thunderbird creates and owns in this model the content outright. They’re making their own content that they retain full monetization rights across formats for. EBITDA margins in owned IP are about double those of service work, but they are choppy. Under IFRS, your revenue recognition only occurs at the point of project delivery. So the revenue is lumpy. You can see quarters in which they’re incurring costs, but they’re not recognizing revenue for the work they are doing. Then, in a single quarter, they will, for instance, deliver a bunch of episodes for a show and have a huge revenue inflow.
Thunderbird has this track record, as I mentioned, that makes it an exceptional partner to work with. Their hit rate, which I define as the percentage of pitches they make to streamers and TV networks that gets accepted into a production and gets greenlit, is over 80%. So people really trust them to develop their own content. Apart from that, they have 24 productions currently across 15 clients, so that includes Netflix, Disney, HBO Max, Nickelodeon, Peacock, and Discovery.
We think that content spend is going to increase. If you look at the history of the streaming wars, in 2020 and 2021, you had a huge uptick in content spend. Streamers were really trying to build their base of subscribers as quickly as possible and compete against one another. With the pricing across platforms roughly the same, content was the main differentiator. So there was a huge amount of spend on content, and Thunderbird really benefited from those tailwinds. Later on, in about 2023, there came the Hollywood Writer Strike, and shareholders at the streaming companies really pushed for them to focus on profitability, so they reined back spending. You are now at a point where the streamers are profitable, and the average American household with the rise of bundling has on average four subscriptions to four streaming platforms.
At this point, what I think is going to happen is I think we are reaching a new steady state in which the streamers are going to compete to maintain subscribers. When you think about the type of content that is most protected from content cuts, from further rain and spending, it’s really children's content. Family households and accounts churn at less than half the rate of the average subscriber. It’s really part of the streamers' strategy, which is to invest in content that families watch together because it really creates a stickier revenue base. So when you think about the streamers cutting back on content, the piece that is least likely to be hit is children's content. It’s constantly in demand. Our channel checks confirm this, that there is a demand that outstrips supply, and you’re going to see an imbalanced supply demand going forward, which means that the area that Thunderbird plays the most in is going to be unaffected.
The last piece that I wanted to mention is these refundable tax credits that Thunderbird benefits from. They have a highly favorable cost structure due to highly favorable production subsidies that exist in Canada. Those include tax credits from the Canadian production tax credit fund, incentives from the Canadian media fund, and provincial tax credits offered by the province of British Columbia that collectively cover 75% of the labor costs in production. These are refundable tax credits. So even if the tax bill is zero, the company gets a check in the mail, refunding them for the amount they spend on labor. That allows Thunderbird to outbid its competitors in the bidding process for content and also take on projects that competitors cannot take on economically. It is pretty much the very definition of a moat; it’s one that other companies cannot replicate.
In terms of catalysts, the company, we think there’ll be some kind of capital return. We think it is possible the company gets sold. The company, from our talks with investors, certainly wants to get sold to a strategic acquirer of private equity. You have a tired shareholder base that from our talks with them want that as well. But hard catalysts in the next twelve months are its uplisting to the Toronto Stock Exchange. They are applying to the main TSX board this year, which should increase visibility and hopefully lead to some multiple expansion. When you think of an asymmetric bet, we don’t know how much more asymmetric of a bet you can get in the public markets than buying a solid company with real tailwinds at a sub 2x EBITDA multiple. That is the summary.
I don’t think it’s an overly complicated story to understand besides the dynamics of the recent activist involvement from Voss Capital, which I can’t speak to as well, because I’m not privy to those discussions. The short story is I think management, the shareholders, Voss included, really want to sell this thing at a reasonable price. From what I can tell, this is a cash flow positive, cash flow generating business that, even though I think it often gets mistaken for a hits driven Hollywood studio type business, that’s really not the case. This is a business that has pretty predictable revenue, near recurring work. They’re usually contracted, and they don’t put up their own capital at all to make a project. So even on the IP that they make themselves, they presell all the shows to their streaming partners. So they’ll make a show, they will pitch a show, presell the show to Netflix, and then it has these negative working capital dynamics that are the exact opposite of the Hollywood studio business in which you have heavily front loaded investments that are made into production. Hopefully, I can answer whatever questions you have, but that’s my take on the company.
Analyst 2: That was very helpful. For quick context, we had been involved with Thunderbird for a few years now. I think we were relatively early believers. I think we started looking at Thunderbird near 2021, of course, before the market corrected itself. I think we largely became interested in Thunderbird for the reasons that you mentioned. We were attracted to the demand for children's content. I think we saw the strategic interest in the space with Blackstone acquiring Hello Sunshine. I think there was a lot of strategic interest in the space. We had that thesis. Of course, we love the tax subsidies from the Canadian government. We love that they de-risk their projects. To your point, one thing that was interesting was they basically de-risked the shows before production by getting someone to acquire the rights to the show.
Sophon Capital: Those negative working capital dynamics are a pretty big piece of the story that I should not have breezed through or said rather at the end. It completely changes the dynamic. I think it also speaks to the reputation because few players are able to do that. I think it explains why when you look at this and are like, “Why is this so cheap?”, you have a tired shareholder base that is dumping the stock. That is one thing. But I also think this is mistaken to be a typical Hollywood studio business, and that is not what it is. I would almost describe it as a professional services business, almost like a Goldman Sachs or Bain & Co. for children’s animation, with favorable working capital dynamics and a free embedded call option on the likelihood of a home run hit.
I think it’s a fundamentally different business model. When you think about Hollywood Studios, I think they operate very similarly to VC investing in Silicon Valley. So you have a lot of darts being thrown into the board, and one dart compensates for all the losses that you have and drives the vast majority of profits or returns. In the typical Hollywood studio model, you will have a lot of flops, and then you will have one blockbuster hit that makes up for all the flops. In Thunderbird's case, they’re kind of hitting singles. By doing shots on goal each time, where they ensure profit because they presell the content, there is the opportunity for that home run, slam dunk hit. I mean, you look at the stock and it is cheap without the IP development. It’s cheap just looking at it as a multiple of the service production EBITDA. But when you think about the optionality of creating a next Peppa the Pig, which was sold for just shy of $4 billion to Hasbro, if that were to happen, all of the people who bought Thunderbird or were involved in Thunderbird will be able to retire happily for the entirety of their lives. That will cause the stock to be a 200 bagger. I think it’s a quirky little business; I haven’t seen anything quite like it.
Analyst 2: I think we’ve largely covered the bull thesis. I am happy to play devil's advocate here, as someone who had gotten burned by Thunderbird and has now given up on the story. For more context for the readers, we had talked to the management team regularly as well as some of the top shareholders involved with the name. I had basically been pitched the IP angle by the team for a number of years. To your point, it made a lot of sense where it’s like they’re batting singles, and once they hit a home run, they really monetize off of the licensing margins from toys and shows and whatnot. That was very compelling to me. __But the problem was they had been telling me this since the start of 2023. The question then becomes, “When would they hit this grand slam of sorts, Peppa Pig”? So one of my concerns is I wonder how long they are going to tell the same story. In the case of the share price, I am curious, are people on the fence because they know what it takes to make this share price move upward.__ It would be like, “Hey, they land the next Peppa the Pig.” Because I remember when they were telling me about Mermicorno, which I’m not actually sure how that is progressing.
Sophon Capital: They haven’t lost money on it, nor has it been. I don’t think, to my knowledge and my discussions with the company have been scarce. I don’t know if they even disclosed this, but to my knowledge, they do not. Their business model allows them to not really lose money on IP, because they presell the content. Mermicorno, Last Kids on Earth, those were sizable. Last Kids on Earth, which is one of their pieces of their IP, that was in the top 10 watch list, not just for children's and animation on Netflix, but Netflix overall. Someone I talked to, who is an investor involved with WildBrain, which is often referred to as a comp, says that the real value of the way to gauge value of IP and entertainment IP, which is really what media companies refer to as their moat, is to look at whether they lead to high volume, high margin, consumer IP sales. If you do the math, let’s say there is $1 billion in sales of consumer IP for some blockbuster hit. Production that resulted in $1 billion of consumer spending is a huge hit. You’d say maybe wholesale margins on that are 50%, so $500 million in wholesale revenue. Then you would say maybe the royalty economics are 10% of that. So if you’re looking at a real hit that generates $1 billion in revenue, that generates just $50 million in top line revenue, which indeed does flow down to the bottom line. But I think the point made is that it is a lofty aspiration, but I don’t think you necessarily need that slam dunk. Again, if they produce $50 million in incremental EBITDA with 100% margins, then again, this becomes a slam dunk, a huge multibagger. But I don’t think you necessarily need that for the stock to work.
I think what really, when you talk about getting burned on Thunderbird and the multiple being outrageously low, I think people know that Thunderbird launched an auction, a sale process, for the asset, and it did not result in a cash bid. That scares people off because they think something is inherently wrong with the asset. I happen to know, having heard whispers through the grapevine, that the main reason why a sale did not occur was because buyers were worried, namely, financial sponsors were worried about the risk of AI disintermediating and content creation and animation, which I think you can get into a whole other discussion about whether that is a valid risk. I personally don’t think it is. But I think the shareholder base is very concentrated. I think the top five or six shareholders make up 50% of the stock. From my discussions with them, they’re not happy with how things have gone. They want this to be sold. I think when you look at these shareholders, they are probably sellers, net sellers of the stock. I think that’s causing some downward pressure on the stock because people just want a sale process to be finalized already.
I think the story of Thunderbird is interesting also because one of the things about it is that it’s all project based. So it is incredibly asset-light. If Thunderbird wanted to grow 200% tomorrow, theoretically, they could do that because they are really almost project managers who get paid. Once they bid on a project, they get paid by the streamer if they win the project. As they go and assemble a team of contractors to make the content, they do not have employees on the books, and they don’t have to invest their own money into production. So if they wanted to 2x or 3x their output and revenue tomorrow, I think they could do it. I listened to the CEO speak, and I think she is, I am a fan of hers to start off with, but I think they are taking a very measured, risk conscious approach to growing the company and not moving and growing too quickly. But eventually, they’re going to grow to a point where the valuation just becomes ludicrously cheap, and it can’t stay this cheap forever. I think the uplisting is going to give them a lot more liquidity. I think there will be some kind of capital return, which is also going to improve liquidity. I don’t think it is going to be in the form of a dividend. It is going to be in the form of NCIB, a share buyback. That will improve liquidity. I think the issues are liquidity, investors wary of private equity not buying the asset. To your point about IP, I don’t think it’s as much a concern that people want to see it in the numbers – the IP story to turn into reality. I think, frankly, that it’s impossible to model. It’s really a free call option. How do you model a hit materializing for Thunderbird? But I think it’s like you’re constantly flipping the dice, and you’re hedging the bets so that you do not lose money. It’s just a really favorable setup in my case.
Analyst 2: I’ll press further on the bear case to make this more interesting. I worry whether the story of upside is the same as it was years ago. Two plus years ago, management was constantly hinting at the possibility of a sale. At the same time, they were talking about an uplift to a more liquid exchange. Also talking about the IP as a huge margin uplift, potential call option. So my concern would be, it seems like management has burned some of their credibility by just promising the story for a couple years now. To that point, I wonder, I know the CFO, the original CFO got fired –
Sophon Capital: She got fired. She was a very nice person, but I don’t think she was the most competent one. That’s a really important point is that you now have Simon who is a much more competent, capital markets friendly CFO. She was, for lack of a better word, a glorified accountant. No, she is a very nice person, but the feedback I got and my impression from when I was hearing her speak in, there was a call hosted by one of these platforms. She was not good, and this comes also from my channel checks with the investor base who did not approve of her. I think you are very right. You have nailed it on the head why this thing is so cheap is because management overpromised and have under delivered. I think the CEO is actually great. I think Jennifer really wants to build something great with Thunderbird. She has faith in building the next Lionsgate Studios. She has faith in building the next Peppa the Pig. She does not want to just do a quick, special dividend, or share buyback. The truth of the matter is I think today, if she started taking the net cash position and doing share buybacks and then plowing the cash flow into doing capital returns, the stock would rerate. But they do not do that for a specific reason. You listen to her talk in past videos, and she says, “I’m super optimistic today about the business.” Today, she continues to reiterate that she has never been more optimistic about the business, and I believe her. I actually truly believe that she, from her experience working in this field, believes genuinely that she’s going to make the next Peppa the Pig. I am team Jennifer. I am not team Voss Capital. I am in this, believe it or not. This is supposedly from my channel checks, this is the New York Yankees of animation or the Goldman Sachs of animation. Who else but them to create the next piece of award winning IP? Someone has to create it, and I think it is going to be them. I’m happy owning this and seeing that strategy to fruition. I think I am getting it on a very favorable cost basis. I think that over time, it will not remain as cheap. I’m not a shareholder who wants to get in, score a 4x return, and then cash out. I actually do believe in the long term story of the IP. I think management has burned their credibility, but they haven’t done things that are disappointing to investors. They never really burned, how should I put it? They under-delivered. They did not sell the asset, which was spooky for investors. They didn’t yet score a home run, but they never said, “We are going to score a home run within the next five years, and it’s going to be this much of a home run, and this is how much we are going to make in the bottom line from that home run.” They’ve only said that eventually, they think if they keep on executing with consistency, they’ll score a big one. So I don’t think they have done anything, a major mess up with the company. I don’t think they have done anything with the business that was suboptimal in how they ran it. I think these investors just are tired of not getting multiple expansion on their investment, but I don’t think they have executed on the commercial side of the business poorly.
Analyst 2: I don’t think they made any outlandish claims like that. I am really curious for your thoughts about how you would respond to this kind of framing. __If I were to take a shot at this again, if I were trying to be practical considering opportunity cost here, I would argue the liquidity here is obviously very low. So, basically, if any sizable fund bids it up, it will move quite dramatically, which is a dual edged sword, of course. But considering that it’s so illiquid, if someone buys, they probably cannot get out unless it becomes massively liquid with an uplisting, or two, it gets acquired. But in that scenario, I would imagine the incremental buyer would have to believe that there is some major catalyst coming up. Either an acquisition or an IP slam dunk or something that would basically catalyze the shareholder base because I think Thunderbird is more of the same where the narrative of upside hasn’t really changed much. To your point about the AI risk, I think it spooks investors where it’s an amalgamation of smaller things rather than anything outlandishly huge, like accounting fraud.__ I had talked to the CFO when he joined, and it was very interesting to me at that time because I think he had sold or he was involved with the sale of his past company, if I remember correctly. Even then, it’s been maybe over a year since he has joined. Of course, pair that with the lack of an acquisition, then I wonder who the incremental buyer here could be. I think they believe in doing what is right for the long term. But the fault of that is they arguably should not be public just because they are stuck, I would argue, in their ways of, “We are going to – ”
Sophon Capital: I would push against that point. Do you mind if I interject? I think that the ability to be public, they have a high cost of capital, because they are so cheap. But it does give them access to the credit markets, and it does give them the access to financing that other studios can’t easily get access to. That actually is one of their competitive advantages and differentiators against the vast majorities of independent studios. If you wanted to come up with a list of independent studios that are publicly traded, you would be able to count them on one hand at this size, not at any size, but at this level, given it’s quite small. So when we talk about them, whether they should be publicly traded or not, I think they are severely undervalued, but I think we should keep in mind that it is a strategic advantage, being publicly traded.
Ultimately stock prices are determined by supply and demand, right? I think you have a case of investors who are dumping the stock because it no longer meets the mandate or liquidity constraints. And also, they’re a little tired with management who wasn’t able to sell the asset. So, there’s a lot more downward pressure from an old, tired shareholder base that is heavily concentrated and large. If the top 5 shareholders only made up 10% of the stock of the company and it was a normal stock traded publicly with a fragmented shareholder base, I don’t think you would see the type of trading levels you see today. It’s mainly hedge funds who own 50%+ of the stock; they no longer can hold it. They’re putting sell orders, and it turns out a $1.50 CAD – I can assure you that there’s millions of sell orders at $2 CAD. I think it is really a case of supply and demand. I think what will happen is that when they listed to the TSX, which was what they were supposed to do with NASDAQ, they ultimately didn’t do that because it would cost them ~$2million in fees to do that. I actually think it was a big mistake not to do that, but I think the demand piece of the equation will increase substantially. When you get more liquidity in an upcoming shareholder buyback, which I think is coming, you will see more interest in the stock and the demand tilt in the right direction.
Analyst 2: Another way I would think about this is, I think a lot of the hedge funds that I had talked to that were actively involved in this years ago were very excited. There was obviously the COVID boom where you had to pull forward demand because everyone was stuck at home and watching Netflix, Hulu or Disney Plus. That was a tailwind for Thunderbird, but, obviously, then I think they became interested in the multiples that these studios were seeing when they were getting acquired. Whatever other comps there were.
Sophon Capital: I don’t think you are going to see those comps again. I think my recollection is that Hello Sunshine sold for nine times revenue. I do not think you are going to ever see a scenario like that again, but I do think we are in a trough in terms of multiples. I think there will be some kind of normalization.
Analyst 2: The other thing I worry about is that we argue that that multiple will not return. __I think there is obviously the risk, the fear of AI even within the software vertical where a lot of people are thinking, “Software ate the world. Now AI is eating software.” But if you look at Veo3, for instance, which you could argue is kind of like AI slop, I’m sure people wonder, “Is there a big paradigm shift of sorts where the future of content consumption looks different?”__ Because if you look at OnlyFans, for instance, which got acquired, it got acquired for an absurdly low multiple considering how fast it was growing, how much market –
Sophon Capital: Who ended up buying OnlyFans?
Analyst 2: I can’t remember off the top of my head.
Sophon Capital: It was not a traditional buyer. They have mandates, and ESG mandates that prevent them from buying that kind of asset. I don’t know if OnlyFans is a great example.
Analyst 2: But the fear with OnlyFans was very much like, “Do the content creators become commoditized as AI?” Arguably, if you are Grok, for instance, Elon Musk's AI girlfriend or whatever. Can the same be done with movies? I have no doubt that investors will believe that that could be the future. As a result, a lot of VC money will flow into that category. But could that –
Sophon Capital: Do you really think porn is going to be replaced by AI?
Analyst 2: It’s crazy to me to think about.
Sophon Capital: I think that’s the last frontier. I think once they come for pornography, they are coming for everything.
Analyst 2: I think pornography, I would argue, could be replaced.
Sophon Capital: Believe it or not, and we can make the conversation as weird as you want because I think it’s an interesting intellectual debate. I like to think about what are the closest themes that are going to affect company's income statements in the near term. I think a theme that we underestimate that’s coming very quickly is humanoid robots. In ten years, I can assure you there will be real life, realistic sex dolls that are humanoid robots that will be able to mimic every aspect of sex. I kid you not, and it’s crazy to think about. But I don’t know if the same will happen with pornography. We’re talking about sex. We’re talking about the arts. We’re talking about things that I think are really the last frontiers. If we’re really going to talk about AI disintermediation risk for children's content, which is kind of –
Analyst 2: You could argue that children's content is probably the first to go because it is so formulaic in a way.
Sophon Capital: I disagree. I think children's content is not formulaic. I think when you talk about, this is the truth of the matter, and it’s an analogy that is true of everything, that 80% or 85% or 90% of most things are highly mediocre, probably can be replicated by AI, but I don’t think you could have AI create The Lion King.
Analyst 2: But do children watch and evaluate the critical aspect of it, or do they just want a cute character of sorts? But the cost of creation for AI is so cheap where it’s like, if you just believe in shots and goals like Jen does, then I am sure one of them would hit with kids.
Analyst 2: The reason why Adobe was a short for a while is that people thought that Gen AI was going to replace graphic design. You wouldn’t need Photoshop anymore. The AI algorithms are trained on third party content that is usually copyright protected. In almost every case, it’s copyright protected. So when you talk about AI risk, technically, it’s very difficult to create AI content that isn’t derived in some way, shape, or form from other content. I think it’s worth mentioning that. People will be like, “Well, no because I put in an idea for a plot on ChatGPT, and ChatGPT spits out a plot for a children's show.” Yes, that’s true. You can’t easily link what the plot is, but there will be a whole swarm of people who claim that it’s copying their specific content. That’s how the legality of the AI works. So I think that’s one point to also consider is that, can we really depend on a model where content is being created with AI on really what is definitively other people's content? When you think far out because we are in the very early innings, we don’t know how regulation in this space is going to evolve, but I’m damn sure that in five years from now, there is going to be some kind of law preventing people from using Gen AI to create content that is used for commercial value.
Analyst 2: That makes sense. It reminds me of the lawsuit that OpenAI was facing from the New York Times.
I imagine OpenAI and Anthropic – they probably trained on everything that they are not supposed to train on. Now, they’re feeling a little bit of backlash from the New York Times. The New York Times arguably is probably one of the best capitalized players to push back against that. But even then, that does not really stop VCs from funding OpenAI. In the sense, it reminds you of classical disruption stories where –
Sophon Capital: That goes into a whole other conversation about VCs in general. I think there is so much dry powder in the VC space. There is a lot of also just dumb VC money that wants to get into AI somehow that really VCs will continue funding AI startups and startups in general despite things like that no matter what. It’s interesting because you are clearly a really smart guy.
Something like Tchaikovsky's piano concerto, there are two aspects. One, I am doubtful that AI can create something that is as idiosyncratic and wonderful as that. Because part of what makes that piece of art wonderful is how idiosyncratic it is. AI infers patterns, and creates something that’s a very formulaic piece of content. We can agree on that. I think something like Tchaikovsky's piano concerto, I personally don’t think artificial intelligence could make it. I think you believe that content has to pass a minimum threshold and it’s acceptable, and people just want to watch content. I think, true, kids might not be as discerning, but I do think parents co-view the content with their kids. They are decision makers in part as to what their kids watch, and they want to find great content. Great content is idiosyncratic. It is a great philosophical conversation. I am actually blown away.